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The financial crisis that began in 2007 has revealed a need for a new supervisory and 
regulatory approach aimed at strengthening the system and containing the risk of future 
financial and economic disruptions. Three ingredients are needed to ensure financial 
stability: robust analysis, better regulation, and international cooperation. 
First, financial stability analysis must be  improved to take full account of the different 
sources of systemic risk. Data coverage of the balance sheets of both non-bank financial 
institutions and the non-financial sectors should be increased. Moreover, to address the 
problems raised by the interconnections among financial institutions more granular and 
timely information on their exposures is needed. There must be further integration of macro- 
and micro-information and an upgrading of financial stability models.  
The second ingredient is the design of robust regulatory measures. Under the auspices of 
the G20 and the Financial Stability Board, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
recently put forward substantial proposals on capital and liquidity. They will result in more 
robust capital base, lower leverage, less cyclical capital rules and better control of liquidity risk.  
Finally, the third ingredient is strong international cooperation. Ensuring more 
effective exchanges of information among supervisors in different jurisdictions and 
successful common actions is key in preserving financial integration, while avoiding 
negative cross-border spill-overs. Better resolution regimes are part of the efforts to ensure 
that the crisis of one institution does not impair the ability of the financial markets to provide 
essential services to the economy. 
 
JEL Classification: G01, G18, G28. 
Keywords: financial crisis, international cooperation, macroprudential analysis, 





2.  The financial crisis: some stylized facts...........................................................................6 
3. Macroprudential  analysis................................................................................................10 
4. Macroprudential  regulation............................................................................................16 
5.  The international dimension...........................................................................................23 
6.  Conclusions and open issues..........................................................................................27 
References..............................................................................................................................29 
 
                                                 
* Bank of Italy, Supervisory Regulations and Policies Department; ** Bank of Italy, Economic Outlook and 
Monetary Policy Department.  This paper was originally prepared for the 2
nd High-Level Eurosystem Seminar 
with Central Banks and Monetary Agencies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) held in Rome on 30 June 








   5 
 
1.  Introduction 
The financial crisis that began in 2007 has revealed a need for a new supervisory and 
regulatory approach designed to strengthen the system and contain the risk of future 
financial and economic disruptions. The approach needs to be of a macroprudential nature, 
since recent events have shown that even rational choices at the individual level can lead to 
negative systemic consequences. Regulation and supervision should aim at containing the 
procyclical nature of financial intermediation, its tendency to experience phases of boom and 
bust. 
The roots of the crisis lie in the build-up of excessive leverage and unsustainable maturity 
mismatches, the latter largely concentrated in unregulated or insufficiently regulated 
financial intermediaries (the so-called shadow banking system). Financial innovation spurred 
the growth of opaque and complex financial products, whose fundamental value was 
difficult to assess. Excessive risk-taking was coupled with a relaxation of credit standards 
and buoyant credit expansion. The increased cross-border reach of financial institutions led 
to a high level of interconnection between different economies, further enhanced by common 
exposure to certain risk factors.  
Three ingredients are needed to ensure financial stability: thorough analysis, better 
regulation, and international cooperation. 
First, financial stability analysis must be enhanced to include the study of the different 
sources of systemic risk. Data coverage of the balance sheets of both non-bank financial 
institutions and the non-financial sectors should be increased. Moreover, to address the 
problems raised by the interconnections between financial institutions, more granular and 
more timely information on their exposures is needed. There must be greater integration of 
macro- and micro-information. However, since data collection and dissemination may be 
extremely burdensome, the benefits of new data should be carefully set-off against the costs. 
Financial stability analysis models – early-warning systems and stress-tests – are very 
important tools for the assessment of financial risks. However, models also need upgrading 
in various ways, for example through a better understanding of the interactions between the 
financial and the real sector of the economy and the design of more complete adverse 
scenarios against which to assess the resilience of the financial system. A fuller integration 
of the macro- and micro-perspectives is key for performing reliable simulations. Progress in 
communicating the results is also necessary. 
The second ingredient for financial stability is the design of robust regulatory measures. 
Under the auspices of the G20 and the Financial Stability Board, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision recently put forward proposals on capital and liquidity aimed at 
ensuring a more stable system in the future. They will result in more robust capital base, 
lower financial leverage, and better control of liquidity risk. Special attention is given to the 
debate on the various measures to reduce the procyclicality of financial intermediation:   6 
banks should build up resources in advance of a crisis in order to withstand its impact and 
ensure that they are able to finance the economy adequately even during a recession. Even if 
there is consensus about the need for these measures, several technical questions still have to 
be resolved to ensure that their implementation does not disrupt the level-playing field 
among different institutions. This set of reforms requires maximum international 
convergence. Policy measures aimed at tackling the problems posed by systemically relevant 
financial institutions should also be adopted in each jurisdiction; however, differences in the 
financial systems call for minimum harmonization of these options with a peer review. 
The third and last ingredient is international cooperation. Ensuring more effective 
exchanges of information among supervisors in different jurisdictions and more successful 
common actions is key in preserving financial integration while avoiding negative cross-
border spill-overs. Better resolution regimes are part of the efforts to ensure that the crisis of 
one institution does not impair the ability of the financial markets to provide essential 
services to the economy. 
 
2.  The financial crisis: some stylized facts  
The financial crisis that began in 2007 has revealed that significant vulnerabilities have 
been created by the profound structural changes that have take place in the financial sector 
over the past decades. While observers did occasionally point out the risks that were 
accumulating, the actual financial system’s exposure to various sources of risks was severely 
underestimated by financial institutions and public authorities alike. A number of different 
factors, acting both at the macro and at the micro level, contributed to this collective failure. 
Structural changes in the financial sector preceding the crisis 
In the two decades preceding the financial crisis, the volume and number of financial 
transactions in the world economy increased significantly. On the supply side, deregulation, 
ICT, financial innovation and continuous integration of markets at the global level greatly 
increased the range of products and widened the spectrum of risk-yield combinations, 
reduced transaction costs, created new markets and unified previously segmented ones. On 
the demand side, population ageing increased the share of savings invested in pension funds 
and insurance products, while easier access to credit boosted mortgages and consumer credit. 
With respect to the traditional model in which banks played a dominant role in financial 
intermediation, the weight of markets and non-bank institutions such as hedge funds, private 
equity funds and sovereign funds has increased considerably.  
Banks underwent a profound transformation and reacted to the challenges posed by the 
development of markets by expanding their functions well beyond the traditional model of 
intermediation. They fragmented the activity of credit supply by selling outstanding loans to 
other financial operators through securitization. The transfer of securitized assets and their   7 
short-term financing to off-balance-sheet vehicles (SIVs and conduits, in particular) made it 
possible to expand activities and leverage by diversifying (only apparently, as the crisis later 
showed) credit and liquidity risks and circumventing regulatory limits. The growth of 
derivative instruments was rapid. The CDS market, which went from zero to 44 trillion 
dollars in notional amounts in the space of ten years, created an entirely new definition of 
counterparty risk that was much more difficult to assess, evaluate and collateralize. On the 
liability side, banks diversified the sources of financing, resorting to wholesale markets and 
reducing the weight of traditional deposits. The distinction between different intermediaries 
vanished: banks became institutions supplying liquidity as well as a large range of highly 
complex products and services. Although the banks’ share of total activity decreased they 
retained a central role in the economy while becoming more interconnected with the markets 
and among themselves.  
The underestimation of risk 
Under-pricing of risk. – At the macro level, risk premia in equity, real estate, government 
bonds and corporate debt markets reached historical minimums at different times during the 
ten years prior to the crisis. They declined continuously from the mid-eighties. There are 
structural reasons behind this trend: the deepening and broadening of global financial 
markets and more stable policy regimes, in particular for monetary policy, leading to lower 
macroeconomic volatility – and therefore risk (the Great Moderation).
1 But there were also 
transient, and thus less comforting, factors at work: lower volatility in the economy was 
partly due to ‘good luck’, i.e. a historically unprecedented decline in exogenous shocks. 
Coupled with the progress in financial intermediation, these developments generated benign 
conditions. However, the perception of safety was clearly exaggerated. Indeed, an optimistic 
view overestimated the true degree of risk dispersion and the benefits of diversification in 
credit markets, creating excessive confidence in the system’s ability to absorb shocks. 
Moreover, protracted low interest rates may have fed an exaggerated appetite for risk, 
reinforcing the flawed incentives in risk management that played a pivotal role in the crisis. 
Indeed, the existence of a ‘risk taking’ channel – an impact of monetary policy on either risk 
perception or risk tolerance – appears to have some grounds in both theoretical and empirical 
research.
2 From a historical perspective, accommodating monetary policy has been found to 
be a key factor in many credit boom-bust cycles ending in crises.
3 Protracted low interest 
rates associated with asset price booms – especially in housing – very low risk premia and 
buoyant credit growth should ring a bell to policy makers.  
The expansion of leverage. – Low perceived risks and interest rates fostered a credit boom 
in the early 2000s in almost all the advanced economies.
4 This trend was accompanied by an 
                                                 
1 See Trichet (2008). 
2 See, among others, Jimenez et al. (2008).  
3 See Calomiris (2008) and Bordo (2007).  
4 See Hume and Sentence (2009).   8 
exceptional increase in leverage in the international banking sector, facilitated by an overly 
favourable calibration of risk weights to calculate capital requirements on certain assets, 
particularly those included in banks’ trading books. However, to look merely at the 
expansion of bank lending would be to underestimate the broader financial expansion that 
took place. A very important, if not the most important, feature of this broader trend was the 
fast development in some jurisdictions of the “shadow banking system” – largely 
unregulated financial institutions such as investment banks, hedge funds, SIVs, conduits and 
monolines – which increased the availability of non-bank credit to households and firms. 
This phenomenon was particularly strong in the US, where the credit granted by the shadow 
banking system reached nearly 120 per cent of GDP (elsewhere in the OECD it amounted to 
about 60 per cent). The SEC’s relaxation in 2004 of pre-existing limits on leverage for 
investment banks contributed to these developments. Many of the shadow banking 
institutions were actually sponsored by banks and/or linked to them by the granting of 
explicit or implicit credit lines so that, as the crisis later revealed, overall risk was much 
more concentrated in the banking system than actually perceived by regulators, supervisors, 
and investors. 
As experience has repeatedly shown, excess leverage makes the real economy more 
fragile in the face of adverse shocks by acting as an amplifying mechanism, magnifying the 
effects of liquidity and solvency shocks on the wider economy.
5 
Excessive risk-taking and relaxation of credit standards. – Financial institutions increased 
their risk exposure to potentially illiquid positions in many different national and 
international markets, sowing the seeds for a number of possible adverse developments. The 
deterioration of credit standards reached elevated levels in the market for subprime 
mortgages in the US, but by no means only there. Indeed, the underlying reason why 
problems in US subprime loans led to the broad-based macrofinancial crisis was the global 
nature of exposures to increasing risk aversion and deleveraging. When problems emerged in 
the specific US subprime market, this set in motion a process that ultimately led to a re-
pricing of risk across all asset classes.  
Among the factors that contributed the most to excessive risk-taking by financial 
intermediaries, observers have underscored: 
  Longer intermediation chain: the increased distance between the borrower and the final 
holder of the loan under the OTD model of intermediation may have decreased the 
issuer’s incentive to assess creditworthiness and monitor the loan.  
  Flawed incentives: remuneration practices across the financial industry favoured 
strategies directed at short-term profits, disregarding the longer-term risks, and 
encouraged herd behaviour among financial traders. Due diligence by investors was 
insufficient and their reliance on rating agencies excessive. The latter have been involved 
                                                 
5 See Adrian and Shin (2008).   9 
in severe conflicts of interest in their dual role as evaluators and advisors for issuers and 
investors. 
  Complexity and opacity of financial products: securitization spurred the creation of 
complex structured products, such as CDOs, involving the pooling and tranching of risk. 
Pricing models for such products were poorly understood by investors and did not 
generally factor in tail events (such as a nationwide decrease in house prices in the US).  
Excessive risk-taking was also facilitated by the regulatory framework. There were clear 
limits in the new financial context, allowing an apparent transferral of risk outside the 
banking sector and the growth of the shadow banking system. Moreover, arbitrage between 
different activities was possible in terms of capital absorption, with capital ratios not 
reflecting real leverage levels. The system of supervision was also clearly inadequate in 
some countries. The crisis started and propagated in sectors where there was little or no 
supervision.  
Maturity mismatch and liquidity risk. – The structural changes in the banking industry 
contributed, in the years prior to the financial crisis, to boost liquidity in financial markets. 
Banks markedly increased the share of funding on wholesale markets relative to the share of 
traditional retail deposits, fostering “funding liquidity” (the ability to fund maturity 
transformation) with the creation of large and deep money markets. On the asset side, 
“market liquidity” (the ability to exchange assets for cash) also increased with the boom in 
securitization activity that had made banks’ investment portfolios (apparently, as the crisis 
has shown) more liquid by creating new markets for previously illiquid loans.  
However, liquidity risk increased in tandem. Within wholesale market funding, the very 
short-term component (in particular overnight repos) was boosted, increasing the banking 
system’s reliance on shorter-term and more unstable sources of financing (compared with 
deposits that are insured) and the maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities. 
Moreover, as banks continued to be linked to off-balance-sheet vehicles by explicit or 
implicit back-up liquidity commitments and credit lines, the diversification of liquidity and 
credit risk away from the banking system was largely an illusion. 
The fragility of liquidity markets played a crucial role in transmitting and amplifying the 
original shocks in credit markets. Following the first credit losses in the subprime mortgage 
markets in early 2007, market liquidity was drastically reduced as asset backed securities 
lost value and became illiquid. SIVs and conduits were unable to roll-over their debt and 
banks were forced to reabsorb impaired structured products on their balance sheets. Two 
different types of liquidity spirals set in: a loss spiral, as capital losses forced leveraged 
investors to sell their assets (in order to maintain their leverage ratio) while the amount that 
they could borrow suddenly declined; a margin spiral, as haircuts and margins rose and 
investors reduced their leverage and sold assets further reinforcing the loss spiral. Asset 
prices declined, further igniting panic and reinforcing the negative spirals (“fire sale   10
externality”).
6 In addition, faced with increasing uncertainty about their own future liquidity 
needs, banks became increasingly unwilling to lend to each other and engaged in massive 
liquidity hoarding to the detriment of the interbank market.
7 As a result, funding liquidity 
evaporated as well. Rising inter-bank rates and deleveraging of financial institutions exerted 
a strong spill-over on bank lending rates and credit supply to the rest of the economy. The 
liquidity externality becomes stronger and systemic the more institutions are interconnected. 
This systemic component of liquidity risk is neither internalized by individual institutions 
nor priced in markets. 
 
3.  Macroprudential analysis 
The crisis has shown with dramatic clarity the need to strengthen the analytical tools used 
to gauge the build-up of systemic risks The following two issues are now at the forefront of 
international attention. First, for a robust analysis, more timely and complete data are 
needed. The analysis should cover a wider array of intermediaries and economic sectors 
whose behaviour might potentially have systemic implications for financial stability. The 
crisis has shown that even in countries where banks have the lion’s share of financial 
intermediation, systemic contagion might come from other sectors of the financial industry 
(the case of the shadow banking system that played a key role in the unfolding of the recent 
crisis). The second issue concerns the need for better models in order to understand the 
interlinkages between different intermediaries (interconnection) and the relation between the 
financial and the real sector. These questions are on the agenda of policy makers at the 
international level and some initiatives are already at an advanced stage.  
Both efforts to improve data availability and the models used should aim to take into 
account the interconnections between each financial institution and the system as a whole. In 
this respect, macroprudential analysis is justified by the observation that focusing on the 
stability of individual institutions is by no means sufficient for the stability of the financial 
system and the real economy. 
More timely and complete data 
The crisis has revealed the presence of important data gaps, in particular for largely 
unregulated sectors, that were at the core of the crisis. At the international level, under the 
coordination of the FSB and the IMF, work has rapidly begun to establish a clearer picture of 
the activity of other financial intermediaries and specific transactions, such as credit 
derivatives, that entail counterparty risk. The IMF/FSB recommendations presented in the 
Report to the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors refer to the need to: i) 
better capture the build-up of risks in the financial sector by strengthening the international 
                                                 
6 See Brunnermeier (2009). 
7 See Acharya and Merrouche (2009).   11
reporting of indicators on financial health, developing measures of leverage and maturity 
mismatches, and improving the coverage on risk transfer instruments; ii) improve data on 
international financial network connections for systemically relevant financial institutions, 
and increase information on cross-border flows, in particular with a view to better coverage 
of non-bank financial institutions; iii) monitor the vulnerability of domestic economies to 
shocks by strengthening the coverage of balance-sheet information in national economies, 
improve cross-country comparability of public sector statistics, and increase information on 
real estate prices; iv) improve the communication and dissemination of official statistics, 
thereby increasing the ability to monitor at the international level.
8 
Financial stability analysis uses a wide array of sources. Data based on publicly available 
information (market data) – such as spreads on credit default swaps (CDS) – are used as a 
proxy of the risk the market perceives for a given institution. These data incorporate the 
divergent views of investors and are available in a timely fashion. However, they may reflect 
phenomena other than risk, being influenced by the liquidity conditions in a particular 
market segment. Moreover, they could not reflect all the information, if some of it is not 
available to the market, for example owing to the complexity or opacity of the activity of a 
certain institution or market. Finally, market data are often available only for a subset of 
institutions (e.g. listed banks) and are biased by market expectations, for example giving a 
too optimistic picture in periods of buoyant activity. The IMF noted that market indicators 
such as equity volatilities and CDS spreads provided coincident, rather than forward-
looking, indicators of the stresses in the system
9 and that further analysis was needed in 
order to ascertain the predictive power of certain indicators.  
Financial stability analysis should then be complemented by supervisory information. 
This is information collected at the micro-level. Supervisory activity also envisages the use 
of micro early-warning exercises, such as those available for the analysis of a bank’s 
different risk profiles (liquidity, credit risk, organizational structure, etc.). Given these 
considerations, the use of both market and supervisory information clearly helps in building 
a more robust assessment. 
Cross-fertilization between supervisory and macroprudential analysis is a promising 
avenue. In the words of Bernanke: “We must combine a system-wide, or macroprudential, 
perspective with firm-specific risk analysis to better anticipate problems that may arise from 
the interactions of firms and markets.” Recently, in some countries (e.g. the US and Italy) 
the use of thematic on-site inspections has proved to be a powerful instrument for assessing 
the relevance of common sources of risk and has allowed for a homogeneous assessment of 
risk across banks.
10 Supervisory information has the notable advantage of being very 
                                                 
8 FSB-IMF (2009). 
9 IMF (2009). 
10 According to Bernanke (2009): “For example, drawing on our experience with the recent capital assessment 
program, we have increased our emphasis on horizontal reviews, which focus on particular risks or activities 
across a group of banking organizations.”    12
detailed and complete. However, in some cases it might be difficult to aggregate in order to 
obtain a systemic view of the build-up of risks. Moreover, accuracy comes at the cost of 
timeliness.  
The ongoing reform of the European financial supervisory architecture provides for the 
enhancement of both macroprudential oversight and microprudential supervision. Moreover, 
it creates the institutional basis for the two functions to be carried out in an integrated 
fashion, exploiting synergies and achieving a better understanding of the build-up of risks 
for the financial sector.  
The reform is based on two pillars: the first encompasses the scope of macroprudential 
supervision that will be entrusted to the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), a body 
closely linked to the European Central Bank; the second pillar includes the microprudential 
functions that will be allocated to three new European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) – 
with sectorial competences – and to the National Supervisory Authorities, which will 
maintain responsibility for the day-to-day supervision of financial institutions.  
The ESRB will conduct analyses of the European financial system, issue risk warnings 
and, if necessary, make recommendations for corrective interventions at European or 
national level. The ESAs will contribute to establishing common rules and consistent 
supervisory practices at European level (single rulebook), ensure uniform application of 
European legislation, promote consistent supervisory college operating procedures, and 
ensure a coordinated response by the authorities in emergencies. The ESAs will also manage 
shared databases by gathering the microprudential information needed for evaluation of the 
risks of the financial system, in cooperation with the ESRB. The proposed framework 
provides that the ESAs will have specific responsibilities and tasks in the monitoring and 
assessment of systemic risk; in coordination with the ESRB, the ESAs will develop a set of 
quantitative and qualitative indicators to measure systemic risk and an adequate stress test 
regime to help identify those institutions that may pose a systemic risk. 
Analytical framework  
What is in the toolkit of the financial stability analyst? The first point to make is that, 
looking at the various financial stability reviews – the ECB being a notable example
11 –a 
variety of tools are available. An incomplete list includes the results of stress tests, indicators 
of financial soundness, evidence collected from market intelligence and market data, the 
analysis of the balance sheets of the financial and non-financial sector, and qualitative 
information gathered through specific interviews or surveys on the topics that are deemed to 
be relevant at a particular juncture. 
Financial soundness indicators (FSIs) are a set of indicators defined in a comparable way 
at the international level and currently disseminated by the IMF for financial stability 
                                                 
11See ECB, Financial Stability Review, various issues. http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/html/index.en.html   13
analysis.
12 Work is already under way to improve and enrich the set of indicators. They are, 
however, a very important part of the macroprudential analysis and their availability at the 
country level increases the transparency and effectiveness of the oversight process.  
Financial Stability Reviews are an important means of highlighting, for the financial 
community and the general public, the assessment of risks to the financial system. They 
contain more than a collection of information and analyses on the financial system and a 
very important section usually concerns the financial conditions of households and non-
financial firms, whose behaviour impacts on financial intermediaries. Clearly, when a shock 
hits the financial system, the prospects for financial system stability will depend largely on 
the financial conditions of the non-financial sector, the ability of households to repay their 
debts, the profitability of non-financial firms, and the leverage of the non-financial sectors. 
For example, after a crisis has impaired the capital position of banks, it is likely that where 
the balance sheets of the non-financial sector are in a better shape – e.g. non-financial firms 
have an adequate amount of internal financial resources because they are profitable – the 
impact on the economy of deleveraging by banks facing capital pressure will be less severe 
than in countries where firms’ conditions are more fragile. Consequently, the negative 
feedback loop between the financial and the real sector will be less acute.  
Analysis of the non-financial sectors, such as housing and commercial real estate, needs 
to be upgraded continuously, including with distributional data. Indeed, distributional 
aspects are one of the priorities for closing the data gaps that the crisis has revealed. When 
analysing the various indicators of financial conditions, taking account of their dispersion is 
a necessary step to properly assess stability. For example, we all know that an excessive 
leverage is a signal of stress in the economy. But the same average level of leverage can 
mask a different degree of heterogeneity; if the distribution has fat tails, even a “normal” 
average level of indebtedness of a specific sector can imply that there are important pockets 
of fragility in the economy. A robust financial stability assessment calls for the analysis of 
dispersion and this, in turn, implies the need to analyse data at the micro (individual or 
group) level.
13 
Better early-warning models 
The aim of early-warning exercises such as those performed by the IMF and the FSB is to 
have a forward-looking perspective. Data and models able to anticipate the build-up of risks 
are needed. A variety of indicators and models should be used to form a clear picture of the 
outlook for the risks to financial stability. Early-warning exercises are part of this 
                                                 
12Johnston et al. (2009) provide a clear illustration and discuss the limits that these variables have shown in 
highlighting the build-up of risks in the last financial crisis, such as the limited predictive power of capital 
ratios for the future evolution of a banking system’s soundness.  
13 See Hernando and Martínez-Carrascal (2003).   14
framework,
14 together with the informed judgement of the policy maker. For example, 
monitoring delays in payments by borrowers or loans that are considered difficult to recover 
can shed light on the outlook for banks’ balance sheets.  
Stress tests have become a very important instrument for a forward-looking approach to 
financial stability analysis and are part of early-warning-like exercises. Stress tests are a way 
to gauge the resilience of the system, i.e. its ability to absorb potential exogenous shocks or 
shocks that stem directly from imbalances in the financial system itself. 
In addition to being applied at the level of individual financial institutions’ portfolios 
(micro level), as part of risk analysis, stress testing techniques have taken on an increasing 
role in the toolkit available to public authorities in financial stability analysis (macro level). 
The main goal of macroeconomic stress tests is to identify structural vulnerabilities in the 
financial system and to assess its resilience to shocks. In this respect, aggregate stress tests 
can usefully enrich the financial stability toolbox, mostly because they provide forward-
looking information on the impact of possible extreme events. Furthermore, this kind of 
simulation allows the interconnections across economic sectors to be examined, capturing 
major risk sources for intermediaries and disentangling interactions across different risks 
(Quagliariello, 2009). 
One example of stress tests is that performed at the Bank of Italy on credit risk with a top-
down methodology (see chart below). A severe but plausible scenario for credit risk is 
imposed on the banking system and probabilities of default are quantified using econometric 
techniques. Macroeconomic projections on relevant variables that affect credit risk – such as 
real GDP growth – are fed through a satellite model that groups probabilities of default at the 
industry level. A very valuable input is the use of data on credit relationships available in 
supervisory records and in the Central Credit Register. An impact assessment in terms of 
loan losses is then derived by making hypotheses on the evolution of exposures and taking 
conservative measures of the losses that banks incur in case of default (LGD, loss-given-
default). Coherent (with the stressed scenario) hypotheses on the evolution of banks’ 
operating profits allow the part of losses covered by banks’ internally-generated resources to 
be estimated and capital adequacy to be measured.  
                                                 
14 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) describes these exercises as follows: “The Exercise draws on a 
broad range of analytical work as well as market information and expert opinions. These include a large 
empirical toolkit, market and country-specific insights gained through the IMF’s regular surveillance and 
crisis work, as well as consultations with market participants, academics, and country authorities.” 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/ewe.htm   15
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In another approach, often used as a complement to the top-down method, supervisory 
authorities define the macroeconomic shock (or a set of shocks), let the intermediaries 
evaluate its impact on their balance sheets, and then aggregate the bank-level outcomes in 
order to get the overall effect. This approach to stress testing is usually called bottom-up and 
has the advantage of permitting a richer set of information to be deployed – i.e. more 
granular on each bank’s exposure. However, aggregation of the results for macro financial 
stability purposes is often an issue. 
In performing stress tests the macrofinancial analyst is confronted with a variety of 
complex problems; moreover, modelling techniques are still somewhat lacking as regards, 
for example, the inclusion of feedback effects in an increase in credit risk, lending supply 
and the macroeconomy.
15 Macro stress tests performed before the last financial crisis had 
their own shortcomings, in particular as regards the insufficient severity of the scenario, the 
inability to appropriately model endogenous sources of risks – such as common exposures to 
a certain risky asset – or the presence of structural breaks.
16 In the end, a vast majority of 
these models is linear and not able to take into account the materialization of extreme events. 
This suggests caution in interpreting the results and makes it advisable to use all available 
information (e.g. from market intelligence or gathered through micro level supervision) to 
form a clearer picture of the risks ahead. One relevant issue concerns the publication of 
stress test results. Financial stability reviews usually report the outcome of these exercises at 
the aggregate (banking or financial system) level, in order to give a macroprudential 
assessment of the system’s resilience to shocks. The recent experience with the capital 
assessment programme in the United States and the EU has shown that transparency to the 
public of individual stress test results is beneficial in reducing the uncertainty regarding the 
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conditions of financial institutions. In order to have robust and comparable results, close 
interaction between the banks and supervisors is needed.  
The discussion so far has shown that there is no “silver bullet” for macroprudential 
analysis. This, however, does not mean that modelling techniques should not be upgraded in 
order to create a robust analytical framework for early-warning and prevention of the build-
up of financial imbalances. However, the crisis has clearly underlined the need to reinforce 
the regulatory system and to adopt a macroprudential approach in designing the new rules. 
 
4.  Macroprudential regulation 
The rapid increase in credit growth and in asset prices observed in recent years points to 
the need to contain the procyclical behaviour of financial intermediation. This comes 
together with the need to mitigate the possible procyclical impact of Basel II capital 
regulation. This paragraph reviews the debate that eventually led to the proposals – expected 
to be finalized by the end of 2010 – to review the regulatory framework in order to mitigate 
procyclicality. 
The procyclicality issue 
During expansionary phases, banks may underestimate their exposure to risks, relaxing 
borrowers’ selection criteria and reducing the amount of provisions for future losses.
17 After 
the peak of the cyclical upturn, customers’ profitability worsens, borrowers’ 
creditworthiness deteriorates, and non-performing assets are revealed, causing losses in 
banks’ balance sheets. This pattern is often coupled with a fall in asset prices that, in turn, 
further affects customers’ financial wealth and depresses the value of collateral. 
Consequently, banks tighten lending conditions and a reduction in credit supply occurs. 
External financing for non-financial firms and households becomes more difficult to obtain, 
leading to a contraction in spending that exacerbates the recession. 
Prudential rules to ensure that banks hold a minimum amount of capital can exacerbate 
this tendency and reinforce cyclical effects. In a recession, the number of borrowers that are 
not able to honour their financial obligations increases, reducing banks’ revenue and calling 
for higher levels of loan-loss provisions, which should be aligned with the increasing default 
rates. If banks’ profits are not sufficient to cover the extra credit losses due to the downturn, 
banks need to deplete capital. 
Basel II makes minimum capital requirements more sensitive to the risk of banks’ 
portfolios. This is obtained by using risk parameters (i.e. probability of default, loss-given-
default, and exposure at default, which measure the expected loss and, via the supervisory 
formula, determine the unexpected loss) that may be affected by the economic conditions. In 
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such a framework, the cyclical effect is not transmitted merely through the absolute level of 
capital, but also via the change in the risk of the assets held in banks’ portfolios, measured 
by the migration of customers across rating buckets, thereby increasing capital needs at the 
very moment when losses due to the recession are reducing capital. This, in turn, exacerbates 
the negative effect on a bank’s ability to finance the economy. 
The debate after the crisis
18 
In April 2009, the G20 leaders agreed on the need for a financial system with better 
quantity and quality of capital, and less procyclicality. Against this background, considerable 
effort has gone into giving operational content to the principle that banks must build up 
buffers in good time and release them in a recession. Various policy options have been 
considered to meet this goal. In what follows, we report the main proposals – with their pros 
and cons – that helped the Basel Committee to define its present package of measures. 
Binding rules on the estimation of probabilities of default (PDs). – In most rating 
systems, the PDs are assigned in a two-stage process. First, an individual PD is assigned to a 
counterparty (PD assignment); next, counterparties are assigned to rating grades and a PD is 
estimated for each rating grade (PD quantification). The latter is used to calculate the 
minimum required capital for each exposure. Procyclicality can result from (i) migrations 
(i.e. individual counterparties are assigned better or worse PDs as the cycle improves or 
deteriorates), and from (ii) recalibration of  rating grade  PDs (i.e.  rating grade PDs are 
updated as the cycle reverses), or from a combination of the two. In Point in Time (PiT) 
rating systems, banks seek to estimate default risk explicitly over a limited future period, 
typically one year, looking at current conditions. In such systems, the role of factor (ii) 
above as a driver of procyclicality will typically be negligible, whereas factor (i) will be 
important: in a downturn, a large number of borrowers will migrate to worse grades, 
resulting in higher IRB capital requirements (and vice versa in an expansion). By contrast, in 
Through the Cycle (TTC) rating systems, debtors are assigned to rating grades based on 
evaluations of their ability to remain solvent at the trough of a business cycle or during stress 
events. Thus, migrations to different rating grades are rare and their role as a driver of 
procyclicality tends to be negligible. In TTC systems, some volatility of capital requirements 
might derive from factor (ii), as actual defaults do vary throughout the cycle. The table 
below summarizes the impact of different rating systems on the cyclicality of the minimum 
capital requirement. 
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Degree of minimum 
capital requirement 
volatility 
Statistical PD attached 
to individual borrowers 
is PiT 
Statistical PD attached 
to individual borrowers 
is TTC 
Grade-PD based on short-term 
average of default rates 
(not allowed by the EU Capital 
Requirement Directive) 
+++ ++ 
Grade-PD based on long-term 
average of default rates  +++  + 
   
Basel II favours TTC rating systems, but it does not force banks to adopt them. In Europe, 
for instance, most banks have implemented hybrid solutions, including both point-in-time 
and through-the-cycle components. Therefore, requiring banks to adopt TTC systems seems 
a straightforward way to reduce procyclicality induced by capital regulation.  
Strengthening stress tests.  Another option, which can be combined with more TTC 
ratings, is to strengthen Pillar 2 provisions, particularly stress tests. In fact, bank supervisors 
already have the duty to assess capital adequacy in the light of analyses of the economic 
cycle and of macroprudential concerns. In particular, Pillar 2 gives supervisors the discretion 
to require banks to increase capital resources above the Pillar 1 minimum. While not limited 
to this purpose, Pillar 2 rules have also been designed for reducing cyclicality (this is the 
reason why stress tests should consider, at the least, the impact of a recession on capital 
adequacy). Banks can be required, for instance, to run stress tests based on common 
recessionary scenarios set by supervisors and adjust their capital buffers according to the 
results.  
Time-varying capital functions. – Basel II prudential discipline aims to ensure that the 
probability of default of a single bank stays below a given threshold, regardless of economic 
conditions.
19 The time invariance of the rule implies that in a recession the objective of 
reducing a bank’s probability of default is over-weighted and that of keeping sufficient credit 
flows to the economy under-weighted (and vice versa during expansions). It has been 
suggested that a policy maker who cares about both objectives could adopt confidence 
intervals that change over the business cycle.
20 Another option is the adjustment of the asset 
correlation parameter: the correlation would be adjusted downwards in bad times and 
upwards in booms.  
Smoothing the output of the capital function.  A way to reduce the procyclicality of 
regulation while preserving the informative value of PiT rating systems would be to smooth 
the output of the capital requirement formula,
21 either through an autoregressive time-series 
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20 See Kashyap and Stein (2004).  
21 See Gordy and Howells (2006).    19
filter that smoothes capital requirements at the individual bank level
22 or by applying a non-
bank-specific, time-varying multiplier (higher than one in good times and smaller than one 
in bad times) to the output of the regulatory formulae; this multiplier could be linked, for 
example, to equity values or to credit growth and should be announced in each period by the 
national regulators and applied to all banks within their jurisdiction.
23  
An alternative approach for dealing with cyclicality is to rely directly on risk-sensitive 
variables, which are able to maintain the beneficial incentives to better risk management 
offered by Basel II. The Committee of European Banking Supervisors – CEBS – for instance 
proposes a simple mechanism for measuring the gap between banks’ capital needs in 
recession and in normal times.
24 Since the probabilities of default are the greatest source of 
cyclicality in banks’ rating models, the CEBS proposes using mechanisms that rescale PDs 
estimated by the intermediaries in order to incorporate recessionary conditions. In practice, 
the methodology would be based on the application of an adjustment which reflects the gap 
between current PDs and PDs corresponding to recessions. By construction, the size of the 
adjustment decreases in a recession and increases in expansionary phases. Capital needs 
commensurate to adjusted PDs would serve as a benchmark for supervisors when assessing 
the adequacy of Pillar 2 buffers.  
Countercyclical provisioning.  In order to restrict the possibility for managers to use 
provisioning as a profit-smoothing tool, current accounting standards allow banks to 
provision only at the very moment when losses are actually incurred. This can have a 
procyclical effect, as losses do materialize in bad times and the induced increase in 
provisions would constrain banks’ ability to lend.  
So far, though, the only practical example of countercyclical provisions in the EU is the 
Spanish system of dynamic (or “statistical”) provisioning. The Spanish approach links 
provisions to banks’ historical loan loss experience. Another possible mechanism for 
correcting this rules-driven procyclical effect would be to align provisions to expected 
losses. This proposal has been sketched by the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB). In particular, provisions should reflect losses that banks estimate will be produced 
by a portfolio of loans, to be recognized in the income statement on an accrual basis or at 
origination. Such provisions would then be changed through time to reflect updated 
estimates of expected losses. The model would require the calculation of the net present 
value of expected cash flows (contractual cash flows less expected credit losses).  
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of GDP growth from trend. Brunnermeier et al. (2009) propose to use credit growth. Himino (2009) proposes 
equity prices.  
24 See CEBS (2009).    20
Discussion of the policy options 
All the approaches presented above have pros and cons. For instance, requiring banks to 
use TTC rating systems does not seem either feasible or desirable. Indeed, TTC ratings 
would impair the comparability across time of the capital requirement and would make it 
difficult to infer changes in portfolio risk from changes in banks’ capital ratios;
25 moreover, 
they are poorly suited for internal pricing and risk management purposes and may fail the 
“use test” provided for by the Basel II framework, which envisages that risk estimates used 
for the calculation of capital requirements are effectively employed for internal risk 
management purposes.  
Attempts to modify some elements of capital functions – for instance introducing time-
varying confidence levels – would imply new and lengthy calibration analyses.  
Establishing a link between capital requirements and forward-looking measures of 
economic conditions, such as equity prices, could have useful countercyclical properties, but 
would also make capital requirements heavily dependent on the volatility of stock prices.
26 
Furthermore, market variables such as stock prices or spreads on credit default swaps are not 
necessarily robust indicators of credit cycles for jurisdictions where banks are mainly 
involved in retail segments and loans to small and medium enterprises and relevant markets 
are less liquid. Using macroeconomic indicators (GDP growth) may have drawbacks due to 
publication delays and revisions.  
Smoothing the output through autoregressive mechanisms may create perverse incentives 
for intermediaries. In fact, a weak bank may be encouraged to increase portfolio risk rapidly 
(gambling for resurrection) because required capital would adjust only slowly. Moreover, the 
calibration of the speed of adjustment would pose practical challenges. In fact, the timing of 
capital restoration after a crisis would largely depend on the choice of this parameter, which 
may be difficult to estimate. 
More importantly, in our view, the variants discussed so far share a main drawback: as 
they define aggregate, system-wide adjustments, they are unable to capture the specific 
features of individual banks. For instance, the proposed adjustments would fail to 
discriminate between banks with more TTC or PiT approaches. Reliance on TTC estimates 
would thus be discouraged as, although capital requirements calculated on the basis of TTC 
PDs would not be sensitive to cyclical conditions, the bank would in any case be required to 
build up buffers in the same amount as banks using more procyclical measures of credit risk. 
The proposal put forward by the CEBS is bank-specific, so that the adjustment is 
consistent with the riskiness of the portfolio; it is based on risk-sensitive conditioning 
variables and therefore meets the incentive structure provided for by Basel II – banks 
adopting TTC rating systems would be required to hold lower buffers than those adopting 
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PiT systems, which would face more sizeable adjustments, consistently with the more 
pronounced fluctuations of minimum capital requirements over the cycle. More generally, 
the approach does not require any calibration of the buffer; in fact, each bank would be 
required to hold buffers consistently with the cyclicality of its capital requirements: if 
cyclicality is a small problem, the solution will be small and vice versa. There are also some 
shortcomings. First, this approach addresses the procyclicality of capital regulation, but does 
not lead to truly countercyclical capital buffers. In fact, the buffers will move through the 
cycle to compensate for the fluctuations of risk-sensitive capital requirements, bringing the 
Basel II framework close to Basel I: the sum of capital requirements and capital buffers will 
turn out to be flat throughout the cycle. If countercyclicality were deemed desirable, other 
tools would have to be introduced, ones that allow capital to be freed in recessions. Second, 
the proposal might lead to wrong outcomes for banks that experience significant structural 
changes in portfolio composition – e.g. through M&As – and would face requirements based 
on past measures of risk that were no longer significant.  
Countercyclical provisioning does not directly amend the procyclicality of capital 
requirements, but could contribute to the building up of resources in good times, to be used 
to shelter loan losses during recessions. Attention needs to be paid to the technical 
specification of the instrument, though. For instance, the proposal put forward by the IASB 
would be based on the banks’ internal estimates of expected losses. Such specification would 
risk being procyclical, as it would generate more frequent changes in provisioning for banks 
relying on PiT estimates of credit risk: for those banks, provisions would indeed continue 
rising during downturns, thus restricting banks’ lending capacity, while their low levels 
during upswings would contribute to sustained profits and lending booms. In the case of 
TTC estimates, the mechanism would work better, but would nonetheless limit the 
procyclicality of provisioning, without really contributing to the build-up of countercyclical 
buffers.  
The proposals of the Basel Committee 
Since, as described above, no single tool is able to address adequately all the aspects of 
procyclicality, the Basel Committee has opted for a set of tools which should ideally 
complement each other. More specifically, the proposal aims at: i) dampening any excess 
cyclicality of the minimum capital requirement; ii) promoting more forward-looking 
provisions against losses; iii) inducing banks to conserve capital to build buffers that can be 
used in stress; iv) achieving the macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector from 
periods of excess credit growth.  
Instruments to achieve the objective under i) could include following the CEBS’s 
approach of adjusting for the compression of probability of default (PD) estimates in internal 
ratings-based (IRB) capital requirements during periods of benign credit conditions by using 
the PD estimated for a bank’s portfolios in downturn conditions. Addressing the same issue, 
the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) has proposed an approach aimed at providing   22
non-cyclical PDs in IRB requirements through the application of a scalar that converts the 
outputs of a bank’s underlying PD models into through-the-cycle estimates.  
Stronger provisioning practices (objective ii) would result from revised accounting rules 
that allow an expected-loss approach to be followed and that are not limited – as now under 
current accounting rules – to incurred losses. 
The capital conservation buffer proposal (objective iii) is based on the idea of 
constraining dividend distribution or bonus payments to bank managers in order to meet a 
predefined solvency target. The farther the actual solvency level is from the target, the 
tougher will be the limits to payout ratios. 
Objective iv) is explicitly macroprudential. The Basel Committee has developed a   
mechanism which would adjust the capital buffer range when there are signs that the 
economy is overheating, for example when credit has grown to excessive levels with respect 
to the long-term trend. This will ensure that banks build up countercyclical capital buffers in 
times of euphoria, increasing their ability to absorb losses in a downturn. The debate on the 
mechanism for building up/reducing the buffer echoes that on rules versus discretion in 
monetary policy. The main issue concerns whether the identification of bad and good 
macroeconomic times should be based on the dynamics of predefined indicators or left to the 
judgment of public authorities. In conditions of uncertainty, discretion is needed to allow for 
the right amount of flexibility. However, this can lead to opacity in the decisions made by 
regulators, raise level-playing-field issues and reinforce political pressure, thereby inducing 
forbearance. Also, discretion-based policy responses may provide wrong signals and trigger 
self-fulfilling prophecies. Under rule-based frameworks, any policy reaction would be left to 
predefined automatic mechanisms and triggers. This would avoid time-inconsistency, but the 
design of the set of rules may be extremely difficult, particularly for a brand new policy, 
which should be applied world-wide.
27 
All the proposals were agreed by the Governors and Heads of Supervision (GHoS) of the 
BIS in September 2010, along with the calibration of the minimum requirements and buffer. 
The table below summarizes the new requirements: the capital conservation buffer will be 
set, after a phasing-in period, at 2.5 per cent of risk-weighted assets; the countercyclical 
buffer will also be required to reach 2.5 per cent at the peak of the credit cycle. While the 
former is expected to be met with common equity capital, the GHoS press release seems to 
leave some room for other instruments – such as contingent capital – for the latter.  Tools for 
smoothing the cyclicality of the minimum requirements will be implemented under Pillar 2.  
  Common equity   Tier 1 capital   Total capital  
Minimum Capital Requirements   4.5% 6%  8% 
Capital Conservation buffer  2.5%   
Countercyclical buffer   2.5% 
 
                                                 
27 See Libertucci and Quagliariello (2010).   23
5.  The international dimension 
The crisis has shown that even economic systems with relatively well capitalized banks 
can be adversely affected by the externalities created by the failure of large cross-border 
institutions. This opens two issues: i) what policy measures could be set in place to reduce 
the negative externalities for the system of such a failure? ii) how can we induce a more 
consistent enforcement of the existing rules, to avoid weak supervision in one country 
negatively affecting stability in other countries and in this way reduce ex-ante the possibility 
that risks are built up?  
An adequate resolution framework, accepted by public authorities, market participants 
and stakeholders, should reduce the negative spill-over effects from the crisis of large 
financial intermediaries (issue i). A proper resolution plan should ensure that the firm is able 
to provide the authorities with all relevant data – even under conditions of stress – in order to 
allow the best resolution option to minimize social costs, provide better depositor protection, 
and ensure market integrity; clearly describe all legal inter-linkages between different 
entities within the group in order to allow a prompt and effective dismantlement of single 
business units, shielding the sound  from the problematic; provide a clear and detailed list of 
all market/infrastructures with which the firm is (heavily) interconnected so as to allow for 
an orderly disconnection. The consequence of better resolution mechanisms would be to 
reduce the systemic relevance of these institutions and the associated moral hazard. In this 
way, the social costs of the failure itself would also be minimized.  
In order to limit the systemic impact of large financial institutions, resolution regimes 
should be able to prevent failure from producing system-wide disruption; they should allow 
the continuity of essential services and orderly reduction or transfer of critical functions 
performed by the institutions. To this end, the authorities should have the power to apply 
different types of resolution options to different components of the firm and initiate a wind-
down for operations not of a critical nature. Legal and operational frameworks should 
include both “going concern” resolution options, which may consist in a restructuring of a 
firm’s capital and/or liabilities, and “gone concern” resolution options, which end a firm’s 
legal existence while ensuring continuity of all or part of its operations or winding them 
down in an orderly fashion. National authorities should be empowered to restructure the firm 
by either applying haircuts or forcing partial debt-to-equity conversion for uninsured 
creditors. Should it prove impossible to restore the viability of the groups (or some of their 
vital components) through the above option, the authorities would also have the power to 
remove the management and appoint special administrators. Special administrators should be 
in a position to actively manage the firm and take the necessary action to keep the bank as a 
going concern (e.g. by arranging mergers with solvent institutions or establishing a bridge 
bank). To make these options workable in a cross-border context, cooperation and mutual 
trust between authorities from different jurisdictions are crucial; moreover, increased 
harmonization of national supervisory powers, intervention tools and resolution procedures 
deserves proper consideration.   24
The global nature and scale of the financial crisis has emphasized the need for 
internationally-coordinated action to address the problems and weaknesses at its root, in 
particular those relating to financial regulation and supervision (issue ii above). Against this 
background, the G20 has decided to provide the Financial Stability Forum – now the 
Financial Stability Board – with an institutional basis and broaden both its membership and 
its mandate. Such measures are designed to strengthen the effectiveness of the FSB as a 
mechanism for national authorities, standard-setting bodies (SSBs) and international 
financial institutions to address vulnerabilities as well as to develop and implement strong 
regulatory and supervisory standards and other policies in the interest of financial stability.
28  
The FSB membership has been enlarged to include all G20 countries, plus Spain and the 
European Commission. This enlarged composition reflects the growing importance of 
financial markets and intermediation in emerging economies and the need to give these 
countries the opportunity to contribute to the shaping of international policies and regulation.  
The FSB’s mandate encompasses new activities, such as a) monitoring market 
developments and their implications for regulatory policy; b) advising on best practices in 
meeting regulatory standards; c) carrying out joint strategic reviews of the policy 
development work of the international standard-setting bodies; d) developing guidelines to 
support the establishment of supervisory colleges; e) managing contingency planning for 
cross-border crisis management, especially with respect to systemically-important firms; and 
f) carrying out Early Warning Exercises in collaboration with the IMF.
29 
To respond to a call by the G20 Leaders at the April 2009 London Summit the FSB 
recently launched an initiative aimed at promoting global observance of international 
financial standards, in particular the BCBS, IOSCO and IAIS core principles. The 
programme includes the identification of non-cooperative jurisdictions which will be 
assisted in improving their level of compliance with international standards. The global 
nature of financial markets requires strong and smooth cooperation between supervisors, 
while the supervisory experience shows that there are many countries and territories which 
are still unable or unwilling to cooperate.
30 
The FSB also agreed on a toolbox of measures including both positive (e.g. capacity-
building measures) and negative incentives. In particular, if a jurisdiction is unwilling to 
cooperate with the FSB process, the toolbox provides for its disclosure from the end of 2010. 
The FSB may also call upon its members to take stronger measures against non-cooperative 
jurisdictions, including sanctions such as restrictions to market access and cross-border 
transactions. 
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The initiative on non-cooperative jurisdictions is part of a wider FSB framework for the 
promotion of global adherence to international standards. Within this framework FSB 
members are called on to “lead by example”. This means that FSB countries should be 
strongly committed to implementing financial standards and participating in international 
assessments – especially in the IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). 
Furthermore, members will be involved in periodic peer reviews focusing on the 
implementation and effectiveness of international financial standards and policies agreed 
within the FSB. 
The FSB initiatives aim to bring a “race to the top” into the regulation and supervision of 
financial institutions. Regulatory arbitrage allowed financial institutions to expand their 
business across jurisdictions, hampering supervisors’ ability to oversee banks’ worldwide 
business. Differences and inconsistencies in the implementation of regulatory standards also 
affect the international level playing field as they give competitive advantage to institutions 
and market places that are less regulated. During the financial crisis well-regulated and 
soundly-supervised institutions proved more resilient to systemic turmoil and in some cases 
survived without public support. 
Cooperation between supervisors may help to strengthen the observance of prudential 
standards also by spreading the application of best supervisory practices across jurisdictions. 
Colleges of cross-border financial groups are seen as a fundamental means to serve these 
goals, and in accordance with the G20 and FSB recommendations such structures have now 
been set up for the main international institutions. As the Basel Committee points out in a 
document recently issued for consultation,
31 colleges are primarily meant to help supervisors 
develop a better understanding of the risk profile of international groups. Indeed, 
information exchange and cooperation between supervisors are not only necessary to 
strengthen consolidated controls, they may also prove of assistance to host authorities in 
performing their duties with respect to local components of international groups, i.e. by 
widening the scope of analysis and providing additional tools based on the practices 
developed by other supervisors. 
Supervisory colleges build on the experience gained through cooperation in the 
implementation of Basel II, in particular in model validation. They are now expected to 
evolve into stable fora for discussion of broader issues and to develop supervisory 
approaches based on cooperative work. According to international principles, the colleges 
should have flexible structures reflecting the complexity of the group and the needs of 
individual supervisors. As pointed out at the G20 level, the membership of colleges should 
ensure a proper representation of the host countries, including – where appropriate – those of 
emerging economies. Supervisors that are not core members in the colleges of a specific 
institution should be placed in a position to have the information needed for the performance 
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of their duties.
32 Confidentiality arrangements are necessary to assist the members of a 
college in improving the quantity and quality of information sharing; to this end, more 
convergence of national legislations as regards secrecy and gateways would help supervisors 
to build mutual trust and would make it easier for them to reach confidentiality 
arrangements. 
There is broad consensus at the international level on the benefits of cooperative work 
within the supervisory colleges, especially in core activities such as risk assessment, stress 
testing and model validation. These benefits pertain in particular to the efficiency of 
supervisory processes; collaborative work reduces the burden on supervisors and regulated 
entities by avoiding duplication of efforts, enhances the quality of oversight through the 
allocation of skills and expertise, and contributes to the improvement of supervisory 
approaches. 
More recently, international policy makers have started to consider a possible key role for 
the colleges in crisis management and macroprudential analysis. Colleges cannot work as 
substitutes for other, more specific structures tailored for crisis management, i.e. cross-
border resolution groups that also gather ministries of finance and central banks. 
Nonetheless, colleges could play a complementary role, for instance by facilitating 
information sharing and the development of contingency plans. Finally, colleges of 
supervisors may play a crucial role in identifying the risks arising from large, systemic 
international institutions because they bring together supervisors on a global basis; they may 
also serve as a mechanism for collecting information for macroprudential analysis. 
Currently, risk assessments are conducted according to a bottom-up approach, which 
combines analyses of individual risks with controls and oversight of risk management 
processes in order to obtain an overall risk assessment for credit, liquidity, market, 
operational, and legal risk. Going forward, risk assessments are expected to include a top-
down macroprudential perspective that would enable systemic issues to be identified. 
The EU experience of supervisory colleges has reached an advanced stage; amendments 
to the European directive on capital adequacy (CRD) have now made it compulsory to 
establish colleges for all the European banking groups by the end of 2010. EU legislation 
and the CEBS implementing guidelines provide details on the information to be exchanged 
within the college and on joint decision-making in the field of model validation and Pillar 2 
assessment. Furthermore, the ongoing reform of the financial architecture in Europe 
envisages an important role for supervisory colleges within the European System of 
Financial Supervision. In particular, they will be asked to contribute, together with the new 
European supervisory authorities and national supervisors, to the definition of a more 
harmonized framework, in particular by developing convergent high quality supervisory 
practices to be further transposed into European legislation. 
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6.  Conclusions and open issues 
Intense efforts are underway at the international level to reform the framework of 
financial regulation, in particular for capital and liquidity measures. This paper has discussed 
how the reforms should be complemented by macroprudential analysis, in particular as 
regards better data coverage on the financial system and robust models.  
Some indications on how operational content could be given to the concept of 
macroprudential supervision and regulation are also provided. It should be clear from the 
discussion that progress has been made on both fronts, but that there are still open issues for 
which international cooperation is needed. 
A first issue concerns data availability for macroprudential analysis. This is particularly 
urgent for unregulated financial intermediaries, which have been at the centre of the financial 
crisis. The G20 recommendations to close the data gaps give emphasis to the need for more 
timely and granular information on this part of the financial sector, its leverage, and maturity 
mismatches. How can these recommendations be made operational? How will different 
jurisdictions cope with the need for better monitoring of non-bank financial institutions? 
Stress tests are a very important tool for assessing the financial system’s resilience to 
shocks. The main issues here concern the frequency of these exercises; the severity of the 
scenarios and their plausibility; the discussion of the results with banks’ management; the 
need to ensure that the stress scenarios are applied in a consistent way by different 
institutions when the bottom-up approach is used (an area in which there is clear scope to 
better integrate the micro- and the macro-approach to financial supervision); and 
communication of the results to the public.  
A common international framework for financial regulation has been discussed. General 
rules regarding capital, liquidity and leverage require maximum harmonization at the 
international level. For other measures, such as those concerning systemically relevant 
banks, national specificities will remain due to differences in the structure of the banking and 
financial markets. What is the best way to take into account these heterogeneities without 
compromising the international consistency of rules and the level playing field?   
The presence of systemic institutions that are internationally interconnected reinforces the 
need for cooperation at the international level. This issue is of particular importance in 
economies with a large presence of foreign banks. Some of these institutions might not be 
systemic at the international level, but could represent a source of systemic risk in some of 
the economies where they operate. The question concerns the ways in which national 
supervisors could contain the negative impact of the failure of one of these institutions.  
The measures that are being discussed for systemically relevant financial institutions 
range from stricter supervision to the introduction of capital surcharges, to tax levies and to 
the use of contingent capital and restrictions on the breadth of banking activities. The 
effectiveness and the economic impact of these measures will also depend on the structure of   28
the financial system in each jurisdiction. How should the assessment of the optimal mix of 
these measures be performed?  
Banking crises impair the ability of households and non-financial firms to access external 
finance. The reforms to contain procyclicality discussed in the paper aim to reduce the 
likelihood that banks cut their lending sharply in a recession. However, the question is 
whether these regulatory reforms are sufficient. Or are more structural reforms to further 
develop market-based finance needed in order to reduce the impact of a banking crisis?   
Since some macroprudential tools are likely to be discretionary, it is crucial that national 
authorities adopt homogeneous approaches in the exercise of discretion and ensure a credible 
and consistent implementation of the new rules. Accordingly, countercyclical tools to be 
implemented under Pillar 2 will also require greater harmonization in order to avoid an 
uneven playing field across jurisdictions.  
Peer reviews, supervisory colleges, more binding international standards are key elements 
of future regulation; they deserve our attention and increasing efforts in the future.   29
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